Section 8 Existing Housing Evictions by Cooper, Ian Paul
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 27
January 1984
Section 8 Existing Housing Evictions
Ian Paul Cooper
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open
Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ian Paul Cooper, Section 8 Existing Housing Evictions, 27 Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 417 (1984)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/15
SECTION 8 EXISTING HOUSING EVICTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal government has created a complex matrix of housing
assistance programs to respond to the problem of inadequate and in-
sufficient housing for the poor.' Among the most active subsidy pro-
grams is the Section 8 Housing Assistance Payments (HAP)
Program.2 Under Section 8, the federal government assists low-in-
come persons by directly subsidizing them for rent costs in existing
housing.3 Section 8 has, until recently, mandated that local public
housing authorities (PHAs) participate in unit management and ten-
ant eviction.4
1. See generally D. MANDELKER, C. DAYNE, 0. HETZEL, J. KUSHNER, H. Mc-
GEE, JR. & R. WASHBURN, HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, CASES AND
MATERIALS 141-47 (1981) [hereinafter cited as HOUSING AND COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT].
The housing assistance "matrix" includes the public housing and § 8 programs (42
U.S.C. §§ 1437a-1437j (1982)), the Rental Housing Subsidy or § 236 program (12
U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1982)), and the Housing Insurance or § 221 program (12 U.S.C.
§ 1715e (1982)).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e) (1982), as amended by Urban-Rural Recovery Act of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153 (1983).
3. See id. 42 U.S.C. § 1437(f)(2) (1982) provides:
(2) The contract between the Secretary and the owner with respect to newly
constructed or substantially rehabilitated dwelling units shall provide that all
ownership, management, and maintenance responsibilities, including the selection of
tenants and the termination of tenancy, shall be assumed by the owner (or any en-
tity, including a public housing agency, approved by the Secretary, with which
the owner may contract for the performance of such responsibilities), except that
the tenant selection criteria shall give preference to families which occupy sub-
standard housing or are involuntarily displaced at the time they are seeking
housing assistance under this section. In approving any public housing agency to
assume all the management and maintenance responsibilities of any dwelling
unit under the preceding sentence, the Secretary may do so without regard to
whether such agency administers the housing assistance payment contract for
that unit.
Id. (emphasis added). The 1983 amendments to Section 8 left intact private owners'
responsibility for management decisions. See infra note 27 and accompanying text.
4. Before Congress amended Section 8 in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981, the text of Section 8 pertaining to tenant eviction and unit management read
as follows:
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PHA participation in existing housing evictions raises the issue of
whether tenancy terminations constitute "state action,"5 and thereby
implicate constitutional and statutory protections against violations
of fourteenth amendment rights.' Recent statutory7 and regulatory8
amendments to Section 8, however, limit the role of PHAs in existing
housing management. The new Section 8 procedures alter the rela-
tionship between existing housing landlords and local PHAs and
pose the question of whether statutory and fourteenth amendment
safeguards are available for evicted low-income tenants.
This Recent Development addresses the effects of these legislative
and regulatory amendments on Section 8 tenants' rights in eviction
proceedings. Part II discusses the development of Section 8 eviction
procedures, including the recent amendments to the statute and regu-
lations. Part III traces the progression of state action analysis and
focuses on state action in the context of the Section 8 existing housing
program. Part IV analyzes problems under the new Section 8 evic-
tion procedures and examines potential remedies available to wrong-
fully evicted tenants.
II. TENANT EVICTION UNDER SECTION 8
A. Statutory Mechanics and Previous Practices
In enacting the Housing and Community Development Act of
(d)(l) Contracts to make assistance payments entered into by a public housing
agency with an owner of existing housing units shall provide (with respect to any
unit) that
(B) the agency shall have the sole right to give notice to vacate, with the owner
having the right to make representation to the agency for termination of tenancy;
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, with the approval of the Sec-
retary the public housing agency administering a contract under this section with
respect to existing housing units may exercise all management and maintenance
responsibilities with respect to those units pursuant to a contract between such
agency and the owner of such units.
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d) (1982) (emphasis added).
5. See infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of "state action."
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "nor shall any State deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . ...t
7. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 326, 95
Stat. 357 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(B)(ii) (1982)). See infra note 26 and accom-
panying text for text and discussion of the recent changes.
8. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1984).
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1974,9 Congress substantially revised and consolidated provisions of
the Housing Act of 1937. The 1974 Act authorized, inter alia, a low-
income leasing plan, commonly referred to as Section 8, for newly
constructed, substantially rehabilitated, and existing privately owned
housing.'
Under the Section 8 plan, private owners lease their rental prop-
erty to low-income tenants. Tenants are required, in turn, to pay
owners an amount not exceeding a prescribed percentage of the ten-
ants' income. I The federal government subsidizes low-income ten-
ants by paying the remaining portion of rent due the property owner.
Funds appropriated for tenant subsidies are distributed by the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to local
PHAs, 12 which then disburse the funds to property owners according
to the terms of HAP contracts. 13 HAP contracts also delineate statu-
tory and regulatory procedures for eviction of Section 8 tenants.14
The 1974 Act gave owners of newly constructed and substantially
rehabilitated housing more freedom to make management decisions
than owners of Section 8 existing housing.' 5 HAP contracts gov-
erning new housing projects left virtually all management responsi-
bilities to private owners.' 6 In contrast, the 1974 Act restricted an
owner's management discretion in the existing housing program by
giving PHAs the sole right to terminate existing housing tenancies.17
Thus, Congress relied heavily on both local PHAs and HUD to mon-
itor rental unit quality, tenant qualifications, and owner compliance
9. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88
Stat. 633 (1974).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1982).
11. See id. § 1437f(c). Under subsection (c) of Section 8, the statute sets out the
methods for calculating the required payments of low-income tenants. The amount
of rent tenants are required to contribute ranges from fifteen to thirty percent of their
income. The precise contribution required depends on whether the tenant is classified
as having a low income, very low income, low income with large family, lower in-
come with a very large family or if the tenant falls into the "other" category. Id
These categories were defined in §§ 1437ff)(1)-1437f(f)(6), but were later repealed by
the 1981 amendments to the Section 8 program. See infra notes 19-21 and accompa-
nying text.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1982).
13. Id. §§ 1437f(c)-1437f(d).
14. See id § 1437f(d).
15. See supra notes 3 & 4.
16. See supra note 3.
17. See supra note 4.
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with HUD management regulations.' 8
B. Recent Statutory and Regulatory Changes Affecting Section 8
Existing Housing Evictions
The Housing and Community Development Amendments in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 198119 abrogated the 1974
Act's requirement that PHAs have the exclusive right to give notice to
vacate existing housing tenancies.2" Instead, the 1981 Act provided
that the terms of the lease, coupled with applicable state law, would
determine the procedural and substantive rights of tenants in eviction
proceedings.2'
Regulations adopted after enactment of the 1981 amendments sub-
stantially revised the regulations governing existing housing evictions
under the 1974 Act.22 The new regulations, implemented in 1982 and
revised in 1984, eliminated PHA review and approval of termination
decisions for leases entered into after October 1, 1981.23
18. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.116 (1984). Responsibilities detailed in the regulation in-
clude publication and dissemination of information regarding available low-income
housing, receipt and review of applications for program participation, making hous-
ing assistance payments, calculation of rents payable by participating families, and
authorization of evictions. Id.
19. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 326, 95
Stat. 357, 407 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d) (1982)).
20. Id See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d) (1982).
22. See 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1984). HUD did not implement its new regulations
until 1983. In the interim between 1981 and 1983, there was some confusion as to the
nature of the PHA's involvement in existing housing evictions. This ambiguity led to
several tenants litigating HUD's lack of compliance with the new Section 8. See Jack-
son v. Village of Ossining, No. 82-2012, slip op. (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 1983).
23. HUD adopted regulations shortly after the passage of the original Section 8 in
1974. The regulations governing tenancy termination remained substantially un-
changed until 1982 and stated as follows:
The Owner must obtain the PHA's authorization for an eviction; accordingly, a
copy of the notice shall be furnished simultaneously to the PHA, and the notice
shall also state that the family may, within the same period, present its objections
to the PHA in writing or in person. The PHA shall forthwith examine the
grounds for eviction and shall authorize the eviction unless it finds the grounds to
be insufficient under the Lease.
24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1976).
HUD amended the regulations after Congress enacted the 1981 amendments to
Section 8:
(b) For leases entered into on or after October 1, 1981: The Contract and As-
sisted Lease shall provide that with respect to the unit that the Owner shall
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/15
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Congress hoped the changes in the Section 8 statute and regula-
tions would stimulate owner participation in the existing housing
program and reduce government involvement in the landlord-tenant
relationship.24 Moreover, HUD pursued Congress' aims by assuring
neither (i) terminate the tenancy during the term of the Contract and Assisted
Lease, nor (ii) refuse to enter into a new Assisted Lease with the Family, unless
the Owner decides not to enter into a new Contract with respect to the unit,
except for:
(1) Serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the Lease;
(2) Violation of applicable Federal, State or local laws; or
(3) Other good cause.
24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1983).
The new regulations also provide that the leases entered into before October 1,
1981 be administered by PHAs, as under prior regulations. Id.
In 1984, HUD further amended the regulations. The amendment limited
§ 882.215(b)(ii)(2), quoted above, to laws "impos[ing] obligations on the tenant in
connection with the occupancy or use of the dwelling unit and surrounding prem-
iss.... " Id § 882.215(c)(1)(ii) (1984). The amendment also provided some exam-
pies of terminations for "other good cause," including:
Failure by the Family to accept the offer of a new Lease in accordance with
paragraph (a)(4) of this section; a Family history of disturbance of neighbors or
destruction of property, or of living or housekeeping habits resulting in damage
to the unit or property; criminal activity by Family members involving crimes of
physical violence to persons or property; the Owner's desire to utilize the unit for
personal or family use or for a purpose other than use as a HUD assisted residen-
tial rental unit; or a business or economic reason for termination of the tenancy
(such as sale of the property, renovation of the unit, desire to rent the unit at a
higher rental).
Id § 882.215(c)(2).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d) (1982). The Senate Report on its version of the amended
Section 8 noted the purpose behind the changes:
Section 322-5(e) is intended to minimize disturbance of the private relationship
under State law between the unit owner and the tenant. The provision of hous-
ing opportunities for assisted families depends on the voluntary participation by
private owners of existing housing. The proposal would assure owners that the
procedural and substantive rights of the assisted tenant are the same as those
applicable to non-subsidized tenants. The amendment is expected to encourage
more owners to participate in the Section 8 existing housing program. Section
205 will not affect the rights of Section 8 tenants established under any Federal
statute prohibiting discrimination on the bases of race, religion, sex, national ori-
gin or handicap, nor will it dilute any prohibitions against requiring illegal pay-
ments from a participant in Federal or State assistance programs.
S. REP. No. 139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 256, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 519, 552. In 1978, the Senate committee preparing amendments to Section 8
reported that it had "rejected a proposal by the administration which would have
permitted landlords of Section 8 existing housing projects to evict tenants without
review by the local PHAs administering the program." See S. REP. No. 95-871, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4773, 4788.
The committee noted its motivation for rejecting the administration's proposal:
1984]
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owners that Section 8 tenancies would be subject to the same proce-
dural and substantive requirements as other state-law tenancies.
2
Congress again revised the Section 8 subsidization programs in the
Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983.26 The 1983 Act
eliminated the new construction portion of Section 8 but left intact
the existing housing program and its owner-controlled procedures for
tenant eviction.27
Adoption of the proposal would leave Section 8 tenants to rely on State and
municipal laws for protection, and the committee does not feel that HUD has
provided ample information on the extent to which this protection would be suf-
ficient. In the absence of such additional information, the committee omitted the
proposed change in eviction procedures from the bill.
Id. The Senate's view prevailed in 1978 and the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Amendments, as adopted, did not terminate PHA participation in Section 8
existing housing evictions. See H. REP. No. 95-1792, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 72, re-
printed in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4872, 4892 (1978 House Conference
Report).
The 1981 amendments were a compromise between the strict termination of PHA
involvement in evictions and a continuation of PHA involvement constituting state
action. The requirement of "good cause" before eviction preserves due process pro-
tections while eliminating the requirement of an administrative hearing. See infra
note 87.
25. See letter from HUD Secretary Samuel R. Pierce to Representative Thomas P.
O'Neill, Speaker of the House of Representatives, reprinted in Housing and Commu-
nity Development Amendments of 1981: Hearings Before the Subcomm, on Housing
and Community Development of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban
Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 439 (1981).
26. Pub. L. No. 98-181, 97 Stat. 1153 (1983).
27. The 1983 Act created a "housing payment certificate program." The new Sec-
tion 8 program focused the federal housing assistance effort on increasing efficiency in
program operations and on "maintaining the stock of subsidized housing already
built." See S. REP. No. 98-142, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1770, 1802. Section 209(a) of the 1983 Act terminated new con-
struction and rehabilitation authority. Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 209, 97 Stat. 1153, 1183. The impetus for the drastic
change in Section 8's direction was the perception that the program was costly, poorly
managed, and even unjust. Senator William L. Armstrong noted the historic
problems with Section 8 in his comments to the Senate Report:
Abuses abound. Published reports documented that Section 8 was a program for
the "greedy, not the needy." Elaborate housing was built that lined the pockets
of the developers at the expense of the poor. Other scandalous practices were
reported:
Section 8 contracts were given to developers who, coincidentally, contributed
significant campaign sums to reigning politicians.
Illegal aliens were housed in subsidized units. Those with incomes exceeding
Section 8's already broad eligibility standards lived in units built for the poor.
Newspaper and magazine headlines screamed "Billion Dollar Nightmare at
HUD," "Very Poor Last in Line to Receive Federal Housing Assistance," "Taj
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III. STATE ACTION
The fourteenth amendment prohibits states from denying equal
protection or depriving persons of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.2 8 Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act creates
civil liability for violations of constitutional rights and privileges
under color of state law.29 Fourteenth amendment and Section 1983
protections are triggered by state action rather than by private viola-
tions of constitutionally recognized rights.3 °
Mahal in New York: Symptoms of Rent Subsidy Headaches," "Housing and
Politics: The Way It Works."
S. REP. No. 142, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 109, reprinted in 1983 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1770, 1879. Provisions relating to tenancy terminations in the Section 8 ex-
isting housing program were not affected by the 1983 amendments.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § . See supra note 6.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id The tests employed in § 1983 and state action analysis are functional equivalents:
"[t]he state action necessary to support a claimed violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and the action 'under color of law' required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, represent
parallel avenues of inquiry in a case claiming a remedy under § 1983 for a violation
of the fourteenth amendment's Due Process Clause." Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991,
1013 n.l (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Price, 383 U.S.
787, 794 n.7 (1966); Note, Section 1983-A Change in the Meaning of "Under Color of
Law." Polk County v. Dodson, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 151 (1983).
30. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S.
629 (1882); United States v. Cruickshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). In Shelley v. Kraemer,
334 U.S. 1 (1948), the Supreme Court set out the oft-quoted rule:
[T]he principle has become firmly embedded in our constitutional law that action
inhibited by the first section of the fourteenth amendment is only such action as
may fairly be said to be that of the States.
ld at 513.
For varied discussion of state action analysis, see Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revision Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962); Lewis, The Meaning of
State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14
STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961); Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); Williams, The Twilight of StateAction, 41 TEX. L. REV. 347
(1963); Note, State Action, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974).
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A. Development of the Doctrine
Since the Civil Rights Cases,3 courts have attempted to define the
scope of fourteenth amendment protection by setting parameters on
the actions attributable to the states. The United States Supreme
Court has enunciated two tests to determine the nature of challenged
acts: the "public function" test and the "nexus" test.
Under "public function" analysis, the Court will find state action
where a private entity performs an activity that is an "exclusive pre-
rogative of the state."3 Originally established as a broad test under
Marsh v. Alabama,33 the Court subsequently limited its findings of
state action under the "public function" test in Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co.34 and lagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks.35 In these deci-
31. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See supra note 30.
32. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974).
33. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). In Marsh, the Court held that a "company town" prohib-
iting distribution of religious literature in violation of first amendment rights per-
formed a "public function" which constituted state action. Id. at 509. "Public
function" analysis under Marsh rested primarily on the notion that the "private"
company town functioned as a "public" town by enforcing a state statute criminally
punishing those who attempted to distribute religious literature. Justice Black, writ-
ing for the majority in Marsh, summarized the Court's findings:
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the statutory
and constitutional rights of those who use it . . . Since these facilities (such as
bridges and roads in the "private" company town) are built and operated primar-
ily to benefit the public and since their operation is essentially apublicfunction, it
is subject to state regulations.
Id. at 506 (emphasis added).
In dissent, Justice Reed noted that the majority opinion was the first to extend
constitutional protections to religious exercises in private places and predicted that
subsequent cases would restrict the "public function" analysis to the precise facts of
Marsh. Id at 512 (Reed, J., dissenting).
34. 419 U.S. 345 (1974). In Jackson, a customer brought suit against a privately-
owned and operated utility for damages under Section 1983. The plaintiff alleged
that the utility terminated his service without due process. The plaintiff argued, inter
alia, that since Metropolitan provided an "essential public service" required by state
statute, it performed a "public function" and thereby implicated state action and trig-
gered fourteenth amendment due process protections. Id. at 352. The Jackson Court
declined to find that Metropolitan performed a "public function," holding that the
company did not "exercise . . . some power delegated to it by the State which is
traditionally associated with sovereignty." Id. at 353. Supplying public utility service
was not deemed the "exclusive prerogative of the state," a prerequisite to finding state
action under Jackson's "public function" analysis. Id. Significantly, Justice Mar-
shall's dissent found state action through the state's extensive regulation of public
utility monopolies. Id. at 371 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
35. 436 U.S. 149 (1978). Flagg Brothers reaffirmed the Jackson Court's "public
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol27/iss1/15
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sions, the Court held that only when a private entity exercises some
power "delegated to it by the State" that is "traditionally associated
with sovereignty"36 will the private actor's conduct constitute a "pub-
lic function."
The "nexus" test calculates the level of state involvement in a con-
stitutionally prohibited activity.37 The Court originally enunciated
its "nexus" analysis in Shelley v. Kraemer,38 and required only mini-
mal state participation in the challenged private activity to comprise
state action.39 In Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority,40 the Court
characterized the "nexus" test as a necessarily imprecise process of
fact-sifting.41 The Burton Court concluded that when a state is inter-
function" analysis. The plaintiffs in Flagg Brothers challenged a warehouseman's
proposed sale of the plaintiffs property under state law as violating the fourteenth
amendment and Section 1983. The Court held that debtor-creditor dispute settlement
is not traditionally an exclusive public function. Id. at 160. Through Jackson and
Flagg Brothers the Court limited the Marsh "public function" test to private entities
that perform "sovereign functions"-functions exclusively reserved to the states. See
also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1983); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991, 1005 (1982).
36. 419 U.S. at 353. See supra note 35.
37. See generally G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 999-1020 (1980). See also Note, supra note 29, at 154-55.
38. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). In Shelley, the petitioners challenged private, racially re-
strictive covenants that had been upheld by state courts. Chief Justice Vinson con-
cluded that the state court's "active intervention" in upholding the discriminatory
covenants constituted state action. Id. at 19. The Chief Justice concluded:
We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full and
complete sense of the phrase. The undisputed facts disclose that the petitioners
were willing purchasers of properties upon which they desired to establish homes
.... It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported
by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the
properties in question without restraint.
ld.
39. See id. at 20. The Shelley court broadly defined state action as follows: "State
action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment,
refers to exertions of state power in all forms." Id.
40. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). In Burton, the Court again addressed the problem of
determining when state involvement in prohibited activity becomes state action trig-
gering constitutional protection. The Burton Court concluded that a private restau-
rant, leasing its facilities from an agency of the State of Delaware, violated the
constitutional rights of a black person by refusing to serve him food or drink. Id. at
726.
41. Id. at 722. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, emphasized the inherent
imprecision in applying state action "nexus" analysis: "[T]o fashion and apply a pre-
cise formula for recognition of state responsibility under the Equal Protection Clause
is an 'impossible task'. . . [o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the
1984]
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dependent with a private actor it becomes a "joint participant," and a
sufficient "nexus" exists to support a finding of state action.
42
More recently, the Court has required more than mere official par-
ticipation in private activity to find the requisite "nexus." In Flagg
Brothers43 and Blum v. Yare/sky,44 Justice Rehnquist held that, at a
minimum, states must actively "authorize and encourage" the chal-
lenged private actions. 45 Additionally, the Court in Blum held that
state regulation of private activity, without more overt support, does
not constitute state action.46 Thus, Flagg Brothers and Blurn de-
parted from Burton's fact-oriented approach, which had mandated a
focused weighing of state and federal regulation governing chal-
lenged activities.47
nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true signifi-
cance." Id. Recognizing potential problems in applying a fact-oriented "nexus" test,
Justice Clark narrowly circumscribed the Court's holding to the context of public-
private leasing relationships. Id. at 726.
42. Id at 725. The majority noted that the relationship between the restaurant
and the public parking facility was an indispensable element in the financial success
of the State Parking Authority. Id at 724. The Court has subsequently referred to
mutually beneficial relationships as "symbiotic" and indicative of significant state in-
volvement. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1010 (1982); Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-58 (1974).
43. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
44. 457 U.S. 991 (1982). In Blum, the Court held that state regulations authoriz-
ing changes in the level of care given residents of private nursing homes did not con-
stitute state action. Id. at 1012.
45. 436 U.S. at 164-65. Writing for the majority in Flagg Brothers, Justice Rehn-
quist concluded that states are responsible for private conduct only "when the State,
by its law, has compelledthe act." Id at 164 (emphasis added) (citing Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970)).
46. 457 U.S. at 1011.
47. In Blum, the majority rejected the Burton approach and found no state action.
See id. at 1012. Justices Brennan and Marshall challenged the majority's analysis
because it departed from Burton's requirement of a focused examination of the fac-
tual context: the state and federal regulatory framework governing private nursing
home decisions. See id (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting). The dissenters be-
gan their opinion with a broad perspective of state action:
If the Fourteenth Amendment is to have its intended effect as a restraint on the
abuse of state power, courts must be sensitive to the manner in which state power
is exercised. In an era of active government intervention to remedy social ills, the
true character of the State's involvement in, and coercive influence over, the activi-
ties ofprivate parties, often through complex and opaque regulatory frameworks,
may not always be apparent. But if the task that the Fourteenth Amendment
assigns to the courts is thus rendered more burdensome, the courts' obligation to
perform that task faithfully, and consistently with the constitutional purpose, is
rendered more, not less, important.
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B. Application of State Action Analysis in the Assisted Housing
Context
Lower federal courts have decided a line of cases addressing the
issue of when the conduct of private owners participating in public
housing programs constitutes state action implicating fourteenth
amendment protections. 41 In McQueen v. Druker,49 decided before
Congress had enacted Section 8, the court addressed whether a sec-
tion 221(d)(3) landlord,50 "financially assisted and partly controlled
by the state," is a "joint participant" with the state when evicting a
federally assisted tenant.5' By employing the Burton "nexus" test, the
McQueen court concluded that the federal and state governments had
placed themselves in an interdependent position with the landlords,
thus implicating state action.
52
In Joy v. Daniels,3 another section 221(d)(3) case, the landlord re-
fused to renew a tenant's lease and offered no explanation. By apply-
ing the Burton fact-oriented approach, the Joy court found state
action.54 The Joy court determined that the state was sufficiently in-
volved in unit management and tenancy terminations through state-
authorized and administered rent subsidies, mortgage benefits, and
by its use of state eviction procedures."
Id. (emphasis added). The dissenters concluded that the regulations furthered state
fiscal goals, id. at 1014-19, and, to a great extent, controlled individual determinations
to alter or terminate care. Id at 1023. The dissenters also noted that the state's spe-
cific standards, not a private medical determination, directed each nursing home's
decisions. Id at 1022-27. Finally, the dissenters noted that the degree of interdepen-
dence between the State and nursing homes far exceeded the relationship that consti-
tuted state action in Burton. Id at 1027-28.
48. See infra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
49. 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), afrd, 438 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir. 1971).
50. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715(d)(3) (1982). Section 221 of the National Housing Act
authorized the Secretary of HUD to insure mortgages of owners who participate in
subsidized housing programs. Id
51. 317 F. Supp. at 1127.
52. Id. at 1127-28. The Court concluded that the federal and state governments
"have elected to place their power, property, and privileges behind the landlords' au-
thority over the tenants." Id. at 1128.
53. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
54. Id. at 1239.
55. Id. at 1238-39. The Joy Court noted in pertinent part:
In the present case the defendant receives mortgage benefits from the FHA and is
thus subject to the attendant FHA regulations. Additionally, the defendant has
undertaken to utilize the eviction procedures authorized by South Carolina.
While these factors, either separately or combined, have been held insufficient to
1984]
Washington University Open Scholarship
428 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 27:417
After enactment of Section 8 in 1974, courts were required to ex-
amine the relationship between private Section 8 owners and local or
state PHAs to determine whether evictions constituted state action.56
Two federal appellate cases, Jefries v. Georgia Residential Finance
Authority57 and Swarn v. Gastonia Housing Authoriy,58 found state
action in the Section 8 existing housing context.
In Jeffries, tenants brought a class action to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the PHA's eviction procedures.5 ' As in McQueen and
Joy, the Jeffries court adopted the Burton fact-sifting approach for its
analytical foundation °.6  First, the court examined the structure of
Section 8 and its regulations as evidence that Congress intended to
grant primary responsibility for all phases of the program's operation
to the PHAs.6 The Jeffries court also pointed to the mutual benefits
conferred on the landlord and the state, a determinative factor under
Burton analysis.62 Finally, by finding that PHAs performed "specific
government functions" pursuant to government regulations, the Elev-
enth Circuit concluded that they satisfied the "public function" test.63
constitute "state action" they are relevant and material in the assessment of other
evidence of state involvement.
Id.
56. See infra notes 57-71 and accompanying text.
57. 678 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982).
58. 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982). See Note, Administrative Law, Due Process in
Section 8 Evictions, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 471 (1983) (case comment on Swann).
59. 678 F.2d at 921.
60. Id. at 922-23.
61. Id. at 923-24.
62. Id. at 924. The Court noted its agreement "with the district court that 'ft]his
privity of contract and conferring of mutual benefits results in a concert of action
sufficient to be designated state action under Burton." Id.
63. Id. at 924-25. In finding state action through "public function" analysis the
Court concluded that "GRFA's purpose is to build, rehabilitate, finance, and lease
housing by administering the Section 8 program. In authorizing evictions, the author-
ity thus acts pursuant to its public function. Moreover, the former Fifth Circuit has
acknowledged that housing is a governmental function." Id. at 924. By applying the
"public function" test the Jeffries court strengthened the already firm finding that a
connection existed between the PHA and the federal government. The court's analy-
sis, however, did nothing to define further the relationship between individual land-
lords and Section 8 tenants. Jeffries' influence on state action doctrine in Section 8
existing housing evictions is further reduced by limitations placed on "public func-
tion" analysis in Jackson and Flagg Brothers. See supra notes 34-35 and accompany-
ing text.
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In Swann v. Gastonia Housing Authority,64 the Fourth Circuit con-
sidered claims closely paralleling those raised in Jeffries65 to find
state action. The Swann court emphasized that private landlords re-
ceived subsidies directly from HUD that could equal eighty percent
of the tenant's rent in the event that the property is abandoned during
the term of the lease.66 The court also noted that landlords were sig-
nificantly regulated under then existing HUD standards67 and by the
PHA's exclusive authority to determine, on a case by case basis,
whether "good cause" existed for the termination of tenancies.68
Although the Fourth Circuit found government regulation in Swann
,'more indicative" of state action than in Jackson, the court offered no
rationale for its conclusion that PHA involvement in tenancy regula-
tion constituted state action.69
Under the 1974 version of Section 8, as interpreted in Jeffries and
Swann, a finding of state action, coupled with the conclusion that ten-
ants have protected property interests,70 provided tenants with valua-
ble constitutional safeguards. Yet, prior to the 1983 amendments to
the Section 8 existing housing program, HUD steadfastly refused to
admit the existence of a "good cause" requirement for tenant evic-
tions. The Jeffries court fortified tenants' rights in existing housing
evictions by holding that Congress intended to incorporate a "good
cause" requirement in the Section 8 program. This allowed the court
to find that PHAs acting in close cooperation with private landlords
64. 675 F.2d 1342 (4th Cir. 1982).
65. Id at 1344. In Swam, tenants filed a class action for declaratory and injunc-
tive relief against their landlord and the local PHA to forestall eviction. The tenants
alleged that their eviction violated § 1437f of the Section 8 Existing Housing Program
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id See supra note 59 and
accompanying text.
66. 675 F.2d at 1346. See also 24 C.F.R. § 882.105 (1984).
67. 675 F.2d at 1346. See also 24 C.F.R. § 882.109 (1984) (housing quality stan-
dards); id § 882.111 (equal opportunity requirements).
68. 675 F.2d at 1346.
69. Id. The Fourth Circuit also found government involvement in Swann "signif-
icantly more indicative of state action than the mere grant to all landlords of access to
state eviction proceedings, which. . . generally [have] been held insufficient to consti-
tute state action." Id.
70. See generaly Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344 (1976) (property interest in
employment), Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) (person's "interest in a
benefit is a 'property interest"' if secured by existing rules); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972) ("[Slecurity of interests ... already acquired in specific
benefits" are protected property interests.). See also Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth.,
433 F,2d 998, 1002-04 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
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in existing housing evictions constitutes state action.71
IV. WRONGS AND RIGHTS UNDER THE NEw SECTION 8
A. Unresolved Issues
Recent statutory and regulatory amendments to Section 8 pro-
foundly affect the issue of state action in existing housing evictions.
72
By eliminating PHA participation in the eviction process, the new
provisions abrogate the obvious, yet crucial "nexus" between states
and private actors.7 3 Moreover, an analysis of the new statutory
framework in the context of the state action doctrine reveals a com-
plex set of unresolved issues.74
First, pre-Section 8 cases found state action by evaluating "rele-
vant and material" facts without a statutory framework compelling
the PHAs to participate directly in the eviction process. In Joy v.
Daniels, the court found state action by focusing on the aggregate of
state activities: the owner's receipt of mortgage benefits, an indirect
subsidy; the owner's receipt of rent supplements after a direct sub-
sidy; PHA approval; and the owner's resort to state eviction proce-
dures." In the context of the new Section 8 program, PHA contact
with private landlords may result in state action under two theories.
First, the subsidy matrix and the PHA's relationship to owners in the
existing housing program remain broad. Second, like Joy, the new
statutory and regulatory framework requires that state law govern the
landlord-tenant relationship. By strictly applying the state action
71. 678 F.2d at 926. See Payne, State Action in the Section Eight Program, 12
REAL ESTATE L.J. 172, 176 (1983). Payne noted the effect of Jeifries' "good cause"
requirement and predicted the probable result had the court not found the require-
ment implicit in the legislative history:
If the state agency's role were construed to be a ministerial one, as suggested, the
state action nexus would be reduced, and the Jeffries case could have been de-
cided consistently with Hartwood, leaving all Section Eight tenants with only
such protections against eviction as private tenants generally are afforded under
state law. This result, which is not very enlightened, would nevertheless be con-
sistent with the premise of the Section Eight program, which is to support the
low-income tenant in the private market, rather than separate him in public
housing. It would also reduce inconsistencies between the programs.
Id.
72. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
73. For a discussion of Jeffries and Swann, see supra notes 59-69 and accompany-
ing text.
74. See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
75. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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analysis used in Joy, courts may find the requisite "nexus.' 76
A second unresolved issue is the effect that state action decisions
under Section 8's new housing program may have on the state action
issue in the amended existing housing program. Prior to the repeal of
Section 8's new construction authority in 1983, the new housing pro-
gram restricted PHA participation in evictions, thereby reducing the
"nexus" between the states and the owners of new Section 8 hous-
ing.77 In Miller v. Hartwood Apartments, Ltd,78 the Fifth Circuit held
that the eviction of a Section 8 new housing tenant for failing to com-
ply with the material terms of the lease did not implicate state ac-
tion.79 The Miller court concluded that the tenant's connection with
government action failed to meet the "nexus" test because private
lessors under Section 8 are solely responsible for "all ownership,
management, and maintenance" including tenant selection and ter-
mination.8" The court disregarded the extensive federal and state
regulation governing Section 8 new housing lessors and concluded
that private owners operate the housing projects on a day-to-day ba-
sis without government involvement. 8'
By referring to Justice Rehnquist's holding in Blum, the Miller
court reaffirmed that pervasive regulation alone will not establish the
requisite "nexus" for state action. 2 Thus, strict adherence to the
Blurn-Miller analysis in the context of the amended existing housing
program could result in a finding of no state action. Alternatively, if
Burton's fact-sifting analysis is adopted83 and connected with higher
levels of PHA involvement in the existing housing program, then
courts may override Blurn and Miller's view that state action is ex-
cluded from existing housing evictions.
A third unresolved issue is how the existing housing program
amendments will affect the decisions in Jefries and Swann.84 The
Jeffries court explicitly bases its state action finding on the broad
76. See supra notes 37-47 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
78. 689 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1982).
79. Id. at 1244.
80. Id. at 1243.
81. Id. at 1242.
82. Id. at 1243.
83. See supra notes 40-42.
84. See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
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range of contacts between PHAs and owners. 5 Because the Section 8
amendments have eliminated the PHAs' direct involvement in ten-
ancy termination decisions and Blum rejected Burton's fact-oriented
analysis, Jeffries and Swann are weak precedents in the amended Sec-
tion 8 context.
B. The "Good Cause" Requirement
The amended statute and regulations require a showing of "good
cause" before existing housing tenants can be evicted.86 The state
court adjudicating the eviction proceeding will ordinarily determine
whether "good cause" exists.87
In Fitzpatrick v. Pierce,88 a district court held that federal courts
should not interfere with state eviction proceedings because they an-
ticipate that a state court may apply a "good cause" standard alleg-
85. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
86. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text. See generally Schoshinski,
Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposalfor Change, 54 GEo. L.J. 519 (1966) (sug-
gesting reforms for landlord-tenant relations in public housing); Recent Develop-
ment, 21 URBAN L. ANN. 317, 342-50 (1981) (discussing the constitutional
development of rent control and the good cause eviction requirement). One problem
with the new statute and an exception to the requirement of "good cause" is the so-
called "individual unit loophole." The regulations implementing the new Section 8,
24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1984), require owners to show "good cause" for evictions or non-
renewals "unless the owner decides not to enter into a new contract with respect to
that unit." Id See Mitchell v. HUD, 569 F. Supp. 701 (N.D. Cal. 1983). In Mitchell,
the court concluded that the "individual unit loophole" contradicted Congress' intent:
The regulation creates a situation where a landlord can arbitrarily fail to renew
an assisted tenant's lease by transferring the obligation to provide assisted hous-
ing to another unit of the apartment complex. A landlord can "play musical
chairs" with the apartments in the complex and thereby completely circumvent
the explicit Congressional requirement that a tenancy not be terminated unless
good cause is shown.
The "individual unit loophole" created by the Department's interpretation of
section 1437f can also be viewed as contrary to the Congressional intent to help
low-income families secure a decent place to live, and to promote economically
mixed housing.
Id. at 708.
87. See supra notes 22 & 24. See also Fitzpatrick v. Pierce, 533 F. Supp. 167 (D.
Mass. 1982) ("good cause" requirement in state eviction proceedings); Wiggins v.
HUD, 523 F. Supp. 1170, 1178-79 (D. Md. 1981) (discussing constitutionality of state
summary eviction procedures as a forum for determining "good cause"); Recent De-
cision, Landlord-Tenant-Due Process-Tenant of Federally Subsidized Housing May
Not Be Evicted Upon Expiration of Lease Absent a Showing of Good Cause-Green v.
Copperstone Limited Partnership, 36 MD. L. REv. 255 (1976).
88. 553 F. Supp. 167 (D. Mass. 1982).
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edly contrary to both federal constitutional law and Section 8.89 The
Fitzpatrick court concluded that it would contravene principles of
comity and federalism to deprive state courts of the opportunity to
decide federal statutory issues regarding eviction proceedings. 90
"Good cause" eviction procedures do not provide tenants with as
much protection as direct PHA supervision and the state action safety
net. Recent cases, however, illustrate that the new Section 8 proce-
dures will protect tenants from abusive evictions. In Jones v. Orange
Housing Authority,9' the plaintiff complained that her eviction was
retaliatory and without good cause, in violation of federal and state
law.92 The plaintiff further argued that the termination of her lease
violated due process and first amendment rights.93 While the merits
of these substantive claims were never litigated,94 the Jones case
nonetheless illustrates the aggressive actions that tenants can bring
against retaliatory landlords.
Should a federal court conclude that a particular state court pro-
ceeding failed to provide a "full and fair opportunity" to litigate the
"good cause issue," it may enjoin enforcement of the state eviction
proceeding. In Mitchell v. United States Department of Housing and
Urban Development," the court reached this conclusion and re-
89. Id. at 170-71. The plaintiff contended in Fitzpatrick that her trial de novo
would be "subject to a state ruling on good cause that is contrary to federal law." Id.
at 170. The plaintiff cited a recent Massachusetts Appeals Court decision that would
allegedly bind the trial court on the issue of "good cause." Id. The Fitzpatrick deci-
sion is supported by other authorities implicitly permitting the application of state
courts' interpretations of "good cause." See supra note 87.
90. 553 F. Supp. at 171.
91. 559 F. Supp. 1379 (D. N.J. 1983).
92. Id. at 1381.
93. Id. In Jones, the plaintiff began leasing a Section 8 apartment in December,
1981. In October 1982, the plaintiff complained of a lack of heat. Eight days later,
the owner informed Jones that her lease would not be renewed. Id. at 1380. In De-
cember 1982, Jones filed suit alleging eviction without good cause, retaliatory eviction
under New Jersey law, violation of first amendment rights, and breach of contract.
The court issued a temporary restraining order. Id. at 1381. The parties subsequently
settled the case when the owner agreed to enter into a new lease. Id. Later the plain-
tiff filed an application for attorney's fees, that was denied. Id at 1384.
94. d. at 1381.
95. 569 F. Supp. at 704. In Mitchell, the plaintiff's lease began on February 1,
1982. A year later, the owner notified the plaintiff that it would not renew Mitchell's
lease. Mitchell filed suit to enjoin the owner from terminating the Section 8 lease.
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strained the state court from executing its judgment.96 The Mitchell
court also ordered the landlord to continue the tenancy and man-
dated HUD to continue making assistance payments pending the
outcome of the "good cause" litigation.97 Thus, Mitchell indicates
that federal courts will continue their role in enforcing the new pro-
tections for tenants under the Section 8 existing housing program.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1981 amendments to Section 8 and HUD's recent regulatory
changes have altered profoundly the relationship between PHAs and
private landlords. These changes, in conjunction with recent
Supreme Court decisions narrowing the scope of state action analysis,
greatly reduce the likelihood that courts will find state action in Sec-
tion 8 existing housing evictions.
The new requirement of "good cause" before eviction compels
landlords to articulate supportable reasons for evictions. Moreover,
recent decisions indicate that tenants continue to have remedies
available to combat abusive evictions despite the PHAs' absence of
direct supervision in tenancy terminations. Federal courts will con-
tinue to provide forums for Section 8 litigants in the event that state
proceedings fail to address fully the "good cause" issue. Unfortu-
nately, however, low-income tenants desiring to pursue these alterna-
tive remedies may not have access to legal counsel.
Congress' balancing of HUD's interest in stimulating private par-
ticipation in the Section 8 existing housing program against due pro-
cess protections for tenants has resulted in lowered involvement of
PHAs in program management. While providing adequate housing
The owner concurrently filed an unlawful detainer action against Mitchell in order to
obtain possession of the apartment. Id. at 703-04.
The court concluded that the owner's action may have been without "good cause"
and that a preliminary injunction was required to prevent irreparable injury. Id. at
704-05. Importantly, the Mitchellcourt noted the scarcity of low-income housing and
concluded that eviction of low-income tenants should be enjoined unless "good
cause" is shown. See also Tenants for Justice v. Hills, 413 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Pa.
1975) (absence of available housing necessitates eviction injunction); Owens v. Hous-
ing Auth. of Stamford, 394 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1975) (scarcity of housing reen-
forces need for due process protections in eviction proceedings). The Mitchell case
provides low-income tenants who face summary eviction under state procedures an
important remedy.
96. 569 F. Supp. at 710.
97. Id.
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to the poor remains an important federal legislative goal, Congress'
Section 8 amendments may jeopardize the housing rights of the poor
in order to reduce regulatory oversight and maintain private sector
interest in the Section 8 existing housing program.
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